Sexual
harassment of students by their professors betrays the fundamental
idea of a university as a place where everyone can come to learn
and master an intellectual discipline, and be evaluated on their
intellectual competence, rather than their sexual desirability.
Professors
in fields like law, medicine, engineering, or the sciences,
fired from an academic post for sexual misconduct, may well
find another powerful perch outside the academy. That ideal
has been betrayed for a long time, which has led to widespread
frustration with institutional inaction in the face of sexual
harassment — but also to vindictive responses from those
frustrated.
Liberals
who no doubt believe that convicted felons "deserve a second
chance" sometimes sound like they think that accused or
university-convicted sexual harassers should never be heard
from again. But how could that be right?
Punishments
should be proportional to the offense; that is a widely accepted
principle of punitive justice. No one thinks that a sexual harasser
should be castrated or hung. One also hopes no one thinks a
sexual harasser should be prohibited from earning a living ever
again. (Even convicted murderers, released from prison, are
allowed to work).
But
should a sexual harasser be barred permanently from teaching?
Clearly
the answer depends on the nature of the offense and the offender’s
response to a finding of sexual harassment. Some will point
to McGinn’s flat denial of any wrongdoing; others will
note his "unpleasant narcissis[m]," as Gardner put
it. Those are relevant, but hardly decisive. How could his alleged
sexual harassment of a Ph.D. student — whom he had hired
as a research assistant and with whom he was working closely
— bear on the safety of letting him teach undergraduates
for a year as a visiting professor at East Carolina University?
What
about a new permanent academic appointment? Has his punishment
so far been insufficient? He no longer has an academic job or
salary, and he has been embarrassed nationally and internationally.
What more is required? Compensation to the alleged victim? Perhaps
so, and given the lawsuit, he may yet have to pay that.
But
suppose he does? What then? Can he at that point become a visiting
professor at a state university focused on undergraduate education?
Someone
who is found to be a sexual harasser should be punished but
also prevented from victimizing someone else. That seems a sound
ethical principle, but does it explain the current practices
in academe?
On
the one hand, academe is notorious for passing off sexual harassers
‘under the radar’ from one campus to another. If
a professor is accepting a new teaching job under a cloud of
sexual-harassment allegations, that should be disclosed. On
the other hand, there are cases like that of Sujit Choudry,
former dean of the law school at the University of California
at Berkeley, who was found to have violated the university’s
sexual-harassment policy, though there was no finding that he
acted with a sexual intent. Since being sued, he is now subject,
remarkably, to a second disciplinary hearing by his university
— this time in an attempt to fire him from his tenured
position (earlier this month Choudry himself sued the university,
alleging that he was the victim of racial discrimination in
its handling of this case). When does the punishment end?
A dean
of a major law school should not be hugging his secretary on
a regular basis, as Choudry did. Such a dean may not be a sexual
harasser, but he is sufficiently insensitive to professional
norms and legal rules to be unfit for administrative responsibilities,
including responsibility for ensuring that others comply with
legal rules regarding sexual harassment. He should have been
removed from his job as dean. That seems hard to argue with.
So
perhaps colleges and universities should consider another approach
to dealing with sexual harassment by faculty: cut their salaries.
But now Berkeley wants to fire him for the offense for which
he lost his deanship and some salary already. He is now spending
tens of thousands of dollars defending his right to remain as
a professor, even though there has been no public allegation
about misconduct in that role. In cases like this, vindictive
hysteria appears to have replaced a proportionate response to
the actual misconduct.
Some
academics think the punishment for sexual harassers should extend
beyond being effectively fired, demoted, and shamed. Thomas
Pogge, a professor of philosophy at Yale, has been the subject
of several allegations of sexual harassment, though Yale did
not find against him on the most recent claim. (I have been
among those sceptical of the official exoneration, I should
note).
Pogge
has been criticized and excoriated on social media as well as
in a public letter signed by most of his department colleagues.
But all of that was not enough for James Sterba, a philosophy
professor at the University of Notre Dame. According to a report
in The Huffington Post, Sterba is "no longer including
Pogge’s work in exams for his graduate students."
Sterba is quoted as saying of Pogge: "You don’t need
him. He carries too much baggage — he doesn’t have
to be cited anymore."
But
how can Sterba’s decision be squared with the obligations
of a professor to ensure that students are properly trained
in a subject and its literature? In a post on this question
on my blog, most philosophers, fortunately, disagreed with Sterba’s
move.
Even
when proportionality of punishment, and protecting possible
victims, are kept in mind, there will still be cases where sexual
misconduct warrants a permanent bar on teaching. But what then?
A terminated faculty member, especially one prone to sexual
harassment, is likely to continue behaving the same way in new
settings. Is ousting a serial sexual harasser from higher education
just a case of passing off the problem not to another university,
but to a non-academic workplace?
The
problem may not recur in cases where the fired faculty member
can no longer occupy positions that give him power over potential
victims. But sexual harassment is a widespread problem in many
professions, not just in academe. Professors in fields like
law, medicine, engineering, or the sciences, fired from an academic
post for sexual misconduct, may well find another powerful perch
outside the academy.
So
perhaps colleges and universities should consider another approach
to dealing with sexual harassment by faculty: cut their salaries.
Call it a ‘carrot and stick’ approach, though with
a stick bigger than the carrot. Firing tenured professors for
harassment, or cutting their salaries, are both legally complicated.
But the latter approach does not simply pass off the problem
to the non-academic world. Why not punish sexual misconduct
by faculty — at least sexual misconduct that is not criminal,
in which case the legal system should take over — with
serious internal sanctions, not de minimis ones?
For
a first-time sexual harasser, whose actions were not criminal,
cut that offender’s salary by 25 percent (or more if someone
is very highly compensated) for a probationary period of two
years. Then, if the offender gets his act together, his salary
goes back to where it was. Make clear that a second offense
during the probationary period will result in termination and
disclosure of the grounds for termination.
If
an offense occurs after the probationary period, cut that repeat
offender’s salary by, say, 40 percent for another probationary
period, with similar conditions.
Incentives,
as my law and economics colleagues emphasize, often do work.
The incentives for appropriate behaviour when it comes to sexual
misconduct need to be more severe than they have been to really
change behaviour, but they must also hold a promise of redemption.
Absent such an approach, I fear we will see a continued slide
into disproportionate and vindictive responses to sexual harassment,
ones that will either condemn sexual harassers (disproportionately)
to penury or that will simply send the problem outside the academy.