honour and collective guilt
NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND HISTORIC
CRIMES
by
THOMAS RODHAM
____________________________
Thomas
Rodham is a graduate student who blogs on philosophy, politics
and economics at The
Philosopher's Beard.
Your
country has probably done some very bad things. Perhaps recently,
perhaps before you or even your parents were born. How do you
feel about that? Does your present government have a duty to
make amends for the bad things it has done, for example with
apologies and reparations? Intuitively most people think so,
but what kind of duty is that and what does it require from
you as a citizen or subject?
The
standard way of thinking about national responsibility for historic
crimes is to reach for the model of criminal guilt. This has
two parts: national identity in which we establish that the
country standing before us is the same one that did the crime;
and collective responsibility in which we establish that the
people of a country can be jointly held accountable for their
county's actions. Both are deeply problematic.
National
identity presumes that a country, like a person, has an enduring
individual identity over time. So even if all the people who
were alive in the times of colonialism are gone, the actor remains
the same. Just like you are supposed to be the same person now
as the one with your name who played marbles as a child, so
the actions of a country 'in its youth' are supposed to be the
actions of the same country that stands before us now. Personal
identity is philosophically controversial -- after all people
do change significantly in all sorts of ways as they go through
life. But the problem of national identity are more complex,
because countries are corporate entities (similar to corporations).
What really defines a country, like a company, are words not
people: its name and constitution. That means that a country
can be created, or dissolved, with the stroke of a pen. So,
while historians can identify a particular country as responsible
for some terrible atrocity, the real problem is to re-identify
that country in the present. Is the Federal Republic of Germany
really the same country that carried out the holocaust and turned
eastern Europe into a bloodbath?
Collective
responsibility is concerned with showing that a country's people
are ultimately responsible for its actions and therefore guilty
of its crimes. Of course not everyone agrees with, or even necessarily
fully understands, what their country does. But nonetheless
the country acts in their name and so, it may be argued, they
gave it at least their implicit support. In a democracy this
popular responsibility is formalized in the concept of collective
self-government: we all agree that decisions made according
to certain democratic procedures represent our collective will,
even if our personal preference was otherwise. So when a democracy
goes to war all its citizens are, in an extended sense, joint
authors of that action. This condition won't be fully met by
non-democracies -- i.e. most countries throughout history --
but one might suppose that it works by degrees. The central
point is that whenever your country does something bad all its
citizens are assumed to share responsibility for it, and if
they want to argue otherwise the burden of proof is on them
e.g. to show that they did everything possible to protest and
resist.
But
even if one accepts this, there are obvious difficulties in
asserting that collective responsibility passes to present day
citizens of the offending country. First if we go via citizenship
we easily find demographic contradictions. The tiny minority
of Armenians still living in modern Turkey would be considered
co-responsible for the original genocide and would be required
to contribute to making amends, for example by contributing
to any reparations through general taxation, giving up property
to returning descendants of survivors. Many countries have experienced
large scale immigration in the past 50 years. For example more
than a million people from the former British colony of India
now live in Britain. Should they be co-responsible for apologizing
and paying reparations for Britain's ghastly imperialist oppression,
there and elsewhere? If we give up on citizenship and look to
hold the actual descendants of citizens, who went along with
odious regimes like Hitler's Germany, responsible then we may
find that many now live in other countries. In any case, such
a criterion of guilt by blood is something we strongly reject
in other places: for example in civilized debate the claim that
contemporary Jews are responsible for the death of Jesus is
rightly considered both ridiculous and evil.
The
model of criminal responsibility -- linking present citizens
to past crimes by vaguely related actors via collective guilt
- is a complete failure. And yet we still have an intuition
that we are still responsible -- somehow -- for the sins of
our countries. Can that intuition be rescued and worked out?
I think
so. But we must abandon the concept of guilt -- with its foundation
in individual identity and strict causal chains of evidence.
Instead I suggest considering the nation as something we imagine
into being and whose honour we have reason to care about. This
analysis not only provides reasons why we should feel national
responsibility, but also explains much of our actual behaviour.
Nations
are not individuals, nor are they a bunch of individuals stuck
together. Following Benedict Anderson's famous definition, they
should be understood as an invention of the modern world, communities
imagined into being by their members where actual communities
would be impossible. This concept of a nation goes beyond demographic,
border, or constitutional consistency.
It
also extends beyond the now. The past is present in your national
identity as part of the web of meanings, stories and connections
that make up the story of your nation. What is important here
is that it is not our ancestors' actions that present us with
criminal liability problems to consider. Rather it is the values
their actions reveal that is the legacy we must deal with. It
is we who are right now collectively imagining our country into
being who are responsible for the past of our nation since it
is part of the story we affirm. We are, in this understanding,
not the passive recipients of our predecessors' mixed legacy
but agents in that legacy.
But
why would we care about the facts if the important thing is
a nice story that suits us at this moment? Why should we acknowledge
the bad as well as the good things our country has previously
done? Here I turn to the concept of honour, and its negative
correlate, shame. Honour is usually ignored in contemporary
moral theorizing that focuses on the core liberal themes of
justice (right) and harm (consequences) with respect to individuals.
But honour seems particular relevant for analysing non-liberal
moral issues, such as those that concern social norms and symbolic
identity. Put simply, when we put on the dress of our national
identity can we look ourselves in the mirror? Or must we look
away in shame and horror?
This
combined concept of national honour seems to me to meet our
foundational intuitions while avoiding the problems of the guilt
model. All contemporary citizens are presumed to be co-creators
of our contemporary identity, albeit they don't share exactly
the same vision. The continuity problem is resolved in that
it is based on our own affirmation of the past, which becomes
gradually attenuated as we go further back into history, rather
than some unsupportable metaphysical identity claim. That means
it can apply to all citizens without any question of 'blood
guilt,' and even to minorities and immigrants who affirm membership
of the same imagined community.
One
of the interesting implications of this view is that it can
go further than judgements of strict moral responsibility. For
example, there is no necessity to find any perpetrators morally
culpable for the acts we deplore. We may find the past behaviour
of our country dishonourable even while acknowledging that by
the moral standards of the past it was not so, and perhaps was
even well-intended. Canada for example, surely one of the least
blood-soaked nations of the world, pursued a deliberate policy
of assimilation of its aboriginal citizens over some 150 years,
including a residential school system that was designed to 'remove
the Indian from the Indian' and replace it with the arts of
modern civilization. In many respects a humanely inspired policy,
by the standards of the time. But Canadians these days see this,
and the residential school system in particular, as a national
shame for which amends should be made. Canadians have chosen
to make the issue a focus of political debate and action because
such actions are not in keeping with the national identity they
now affirm.
National
honour may also explain why nations sometimes refuse to take
responsibility for past crimes even in the face of overwhelming
evidence. Contemporary Turkey and Japan for example refuse to
take responsibility for the genocides attributed to these countries
by contemporary accounts, surviving witnesses, and the overwhelming
consensus of professional historians. Here, the national story
is too strong: because it has no place for such dishonourable
acts, those facts are just wished away.
It
may seem that this example shows the vulnerability of a model
of responsibility built upon imagination -- people can also
imagine a way out of dishonour rather than admit the facts of
history. But it also shows the power of the national honour
model to both explain a nation's normative duties and to explain
countries' actual behaviour (something lacking in the criminal
guilt model). Once we understand what a nation is doing when
it ducks its moral responsibility we are better placed to say
how it could do better. In particular, it follows from this
understanding that citizens should not only be motivated to
want to honour their vision of their nation, but that they should
want that honouring itself to be honourable. True honour cannot
be bought or obtained with trickery -- that would be like a
soldier lying to get a medal -- and in the same way true national
honour is not compatible with deliberate self-deception. That
self-deception will itself become part of one's national identity
is almost never an issue until it is too late.
How
should citizens see their duty to history? The relationship
is primarily ethical though it has political consequences. The
honourable duty of the patriotic citizen is to acknowledge the
points where your nation's behaviour has fallen short of the
standards one wishes it to embody. The American patriot can
without contradiction celebrate the true nature of the American
spirit in the mutual respect instantiated in the Thanksgiving
story, while at the same time acknowledging the truth of America's
moral failures with respect to its later treatment of aboriginal
peoples. The one tells us what America should and can be, the
other what America now must not be like. Immigrants and politically
marginalized minorities may play a particularly important role
in piercing the veil of complacency that often hangs over a
nation's history, raising uncomfortable facts to national attention
and pressing other citizens to acknowledge that true patriotism
does not consist in the repetition of comfortable homilies but
in a willingness to confront the hard truths. And there is no
reason why this cannot also be applied to contemporary political
debates: isn't torture un-American?
This
analysis also suggests how criticism of other countries may
proceed, through an appeal to their citizens' sense of honour
rather than criminal guilt. The criminal guilt approach judges
countries by external criteria which their governments and citizens
may well reject and reaches simplistic binary conclusions about
generally very complex matters -- either a country is completely
guilty or not. We have already seen that when world public opinion
judges a country guilty of some heinous crime (such as Japan
for its genocidal occupation of China) that judgement can actually
be counter-productive in putting the citizens of that country
on the defensive as a point of national pride. This approach
in contrast puts its arguments in terms that directly engage
with a nation's sense of honour and challenges its citizens
to look in the mirror of history and consider for themselves
what honour requires.
National
honour alone is not sufficient for justice. Indeed one must proceed
with some caution for the honour system itself brings a risk of
ethical narcissism -- of being overly concerned with how you feel
as the basis for ethical judgements, to the exclusion of the suffering
of others which motivated the project in the first place. Its
most important role is in showing why we present citizens should
care about what our country has done. But it is much weaker at
telling us what we should do about it. Does Britain owe a special
responsibility to help the development of her ex-colonies, even
if other countries are in even greater need of assistance? Should
all former colonies be considered equal victims, with Singapore
and Australia on a par with Burma and Bangladesh? How can we --
should we? - use counterfactual analysis and accounting methods
to add up the harms Britain was responsible for minus the benefits
it brought in each case as the basis for calculating reparations?
Apart from emphasizing the importance of symbolic actions of recognition
and respect -- to be seen for example in Russia's recent parliamentary
resolution acknowledging Stalin's massacre of Polish officers
at Katyn -- the introduction of national honour offers no easy
answers to that contested but essential aspect of national responsibility.