THE DIRTY BOMB
by
GRAHAM ALLISON
____________
Graham
Allison is the director of the Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. He served
as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and Plans, and
is the author of Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable
Catastrophe (Macmillan, 2004).
One
month after the terrorist assault on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, on October 11, 2001, President George W. Bush
faced a more terrifying prospect. At that morning’s presidential
daily intelligence briefing, George Tenet, the director of central
intelligence, informed the president that a CIA agent codenamed
“Dragonfire” had reported that Al Qaeda terrorists
possessed a 10-kiloton nuclear bomb, evidently stolen from the
Russian arsenal. According to Dragonfire, this nuclear weapon
was in New York City.
The
government dispatched a top-secret nuclear emergency support
team to the city. Under a cloak of secrecy that excluded even
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, these nuclear ninjas searched for the
bomb. On a normal workday, half a million people crowd the area
within a half-mile radius of Times Square. A noon detonation
in midtown Manhattan would kill them all instantly. Hundreds
of thousands of others would die from collapsing buildings,
fire and fallout in the hours thereafter. The electromagnetic
pulse generated by the blast would fry cell phones and other
electronic communication. The wounded would overwhelm hospitals
and emergency services. Firemen would fight an uncontrolled
ring of fires for days afterward.
In
the hours that followed, Condoleezza Rice, then national security
adviser, analyzed what strategists call the “problem from
hell.” Unlike the Cold War, when the US and the Soviet
Union knew that an attack against the other would elicit a retaliatory
strike or greater measure, Al Qaeda -– with no return
address –- had no such fear of reprisal. Even if the president
were prepared to negotiate, Al Qaeda has no phone number to
call.
Concerned
that Al Qaeda could have smuggled a nuclear weapon into Washington
as well, the president ordered Vice President Dick Cheney to
leave the capital for an “undisclosed location,”
where he would remain for weeks to follow –- standard
procedure to ensure “continuity of government” in
case of a decapitation strike against US political leadership.
Several hundred federal employees from more than a dozen government
agencies joined the vice president at this secret site, the
core of an alternative government that would seek to cope in
the aftermath of a nuclear explosion that destroyed Washington.
Six
months earlier the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center had picked
up chatter in Al Qaeda channels about an “American Hiroshima.”
The CIA knew that Osama bin Laden’s fascination with nuclear
weapons went back at least to 1992, when he attempted to buy
highly enriched uranium from South Africa. Al Qaeda operatives
were alleged to have negotiated with Chechen separatists in
Russia to buy a nuclear warhead, which the Chechen warlord Shamil
Basayev claimed to have acquired from Russian arsenals. The
CIA’s special task force on Al Qaeda had noted the terrorist
group’s emphasis on thorough planning, intensive training
and repetition of successful tactics. The task force highlighted
Al Qaeda’s preference for symbolic targets and spectacular
attacks.
As
CIA analysts examined Dragonfire’s report and compared
it with other bits of information, they noted that the September
attack on the World Trade Center had set the bar higher for
future terrorist attacks. Psychologically, a nuclear attack
would stagger the world’s imagination. New York was, in
the jargon of national-security experts, “target rich.”
As
it turned out, Dragonfire’s report proved to be a false
alarm. But the central takeaway from the case is this: The US
government had no grounds in science or logic to dismiss this
possibility, nor could it do so today.
There’s
no established methodology for assessing the probability of
an unprecedented event that could have such catastrophic consequences.
Nonetheless, in “Nuclear Terrorism” I state my considered
judgment that if the US and other governments just keep doing
what they are doing today, a nuclear terrorist attack in a major
city is more likely than not by 2014.
Richard
Garwin, a designer of the hydrogen bomb whom Enrico Fermi once
called, “the only true genius I had ever met,” told
Congress in March 2007 that he estimated a “20 percent
per year probability of a nuclear explosion with American cities
and European cities included.” My Harvard colleague Matthew
Bunn has created a model that estimates the probability of a
nuclear terrorist attack over a 10-year period to be 29 percent
– identical to the average estimate from a poll of security
experts commissioned by Senator Richard Lugar in 2005.
Former
Secretary of Defense William Perry has expressed his own view
that my work may underestimate the risk. Warren Buffet, the
world’s most successful investor and legendary odds-maker
in pricing insurance policies for unlikely but catastrophic
events, concluded that nuclear terrorism is “inevitable.”
As he has stated: “I don’t see any way that it won’t
happen.”
The
good news is that nuclear terrorism is preventable by a feasible,
affordable agenda of actions that, if taken, would shrink the
risk of nuclear terrorism to nearly zero. A global strategy
to prevent this ultimate catastrophe can be organized under
a Doctrine of Three No’s: No loose nukes, no new nascent
nukes, no new nuclear weapons. The first requires securing all
nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material, on the fastest
possible timetable, to a new “gold standard.” The
second does not allow for any new national capabilities to enrich
uranium or reprocess plutonium. The third draws a line under
the current eight and a half nuclear powers – the five
members of the Security Council and India, Israel, Pakistan
and North Korea – and says unambiguously: “Stop.
No More.”
The
US cannot unilaterally sustain a successful strategy to prevent
nuclear terrorism. Nor can the necessary actions simply be commanded,
compelled or coerced. Instead, they require deep and steady
international cooperation rooted in the recognition that nations
share a common threat that requires a common strategy. A Global
Alliance Against Nuclear Terrorism is therefore in order. The
mission of this alliance should be to minimize the risk of nuclear
terrorism by taking every action physically, technically and
diplomatically possible to prevent nuclear weapons or materials
from falling into the hands of terrorists.
Constructing
such an alliance will require the US and other nuclear-weapons
states to confront the question of a “fourth no”:
no nuclear weapons. While US or Russian possession of nuclear
arsenals is not a major driver of Iran’s nuclear ambitions,
and while Osama bin Laden would not be less interested in acquiring
a nuclear weapon if the US eliminated its current arsenals,
the proposition that nuclear weapons are necessary for the security
of US and Russia but intolerably dangerous if acquired by Iran
or South Africa is difficult to sell to nuclear have-nots.
The question of a categorical “fourth no” has come
to the fore with the January 2007 opinion piece in the Wall
Street Journal by George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry
A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, calling upon the US and other states
to act to realize their Non-Proliferation Treaty commitment
and President Reagan’s vision of “a world free of
nuclear weapons.” Towards that goal, the immediate agenda
should be to devalue nuclear weapons and minimize their role
in international affairs. This should begin with nuclear- weapons
states pledging to the following principles: no new national
enrichment, no nuclear tests, no first use of a nuclear bomb
and no new nuclear weapons.
Faced
with the possibility of an American Hiroshima, many are paralyzed
by a combination of denial and fatalism. This is unwarranted.
Through a combination of imagination, a clear agenda for action
and fierce determination to pursue it, the countdown to a nuclear
9/11 can be stopped.
"Reprinted
with permission from
YaleGlobal Online © 2008 Yale Center
for the Study of Globalization."